Comparative analysis of optimal conditional transfers in a fiscally centralized federation
The international evidence shows that the spending of sub-national governments depends on unconditional transfers from the central government. This evidence makes relevant the following question: What is the optimal design of inter-governmental transfers? In this article we provide an answer to this...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | José Antonio Carrillo Viramontes, Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez |
---|---|
Format: | Artículo |
Sprog: | spa |
Udgivet: |
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
2021
|
Fag: | |
Online adgang: | http://erevistas.uacj.mx/ojs/index.php/noesis/article/view/253 |
Tags: |
Tilføj Tag
Ingen Tags, Vær først til at tagge denne postø!
|
Lignende værker
-
Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism. A Fine Balance
af: Hankla, Charles R.
Udgivet: (2019) -
The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem
af: Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto
Udgivet: (2020) -
Social Weights and the Regional Allocation of Inter-Governmental Transfers
af: Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto
Udgivet: (2019) -
Fiscal discipline: Fiscal policy limits for encourage development in Mexico
af: Patricia Carmina Inzunza Mejía, et al.
Udgivet: (2021) - Muelle fiscal : Campeche, E.U.M.